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GRAND JURY DISCRIMINATION 
CHALLENGES: DEFEAT BY DEFAULT 
MARTHA STONE* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The sixth amendment guarantee to assistance of counsel is 
among those constitutional rights "so basic to a fair trial that their 
infraction can never be treated as harmless error."1 Protection of 
this right, however, requires more than the mere presence of an 
attorney who stands mute beside a criminal defendant when he ap­
pears in court to face the charges against him. Absent active partic­
ipation and aggressive advocacy by a defendant's legal representa­
tive, any benefit derived from the right to counsel is meaningle~s. 
Thus, the United States Supreme Court has emphasized repeatedly 
, " 'that the right to counsel necessarily implies the right to effective 
, , assistance of counsel. 2 
, '" iq. re~pons~ to this admonition, conscientious criminal defense 
attorneys vigorously fulfill their professional obligations by filing a 
prolific display of pretnal motions to protect their clients' rights. 
Legal motions seeking discovery, reduction of bail, competency' de­
terminations, suppression of tangible evidence, statements, and 
identifications appear with regularity. Because the judiciary has 
been far from reluctant to chastise defense attorneys' poor perform­
ances in these areas, 3 those lawyers who suffer from lack of initia­
tive or knowledge are put on notice of the type of representation to 
which they must aspire. Thus, in many instances, judicial expecta­
tions have defined the parameters of effective representation. 
Conspicuously absent from the avalanche of motions filed by 
criminal defense attorneys are those that challenge the grand jury 
* B.A., Wheaton College; J.D., Georgetown University Law Center; Legal Di­
rector, Connecticut Civil Liberties Union, Hartford, Connecticut. The author grate­
fully acknowledges the assistance of Alan Gelfand, Department of Statistics, Univer­
sity of Connecticut at Storrs, and the assistance of Samuel Chemiak. 
1. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967). 
2. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 
258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970). 
3. See United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196, 223 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1979); Coles 
v. Peyton, 389 F.2d 224, 226 (4th Cir. 1968); ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS­
TICE § 3.6(a) (1978). 
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panel on the ground that the selection process systematically ex­
cludes members of a particular race or ethnic background in viola­
tion of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to 
the United States Constitution. While it is true that in some areas 
of the country grounds upon which to challenge the grand jury are 
almost nonexistent,4 the dearth of such motions on the part of even 
the best criminal defense attorneys is puzzling. 5 
One logical explanation is the misconception held by many de­
fense attorneys that such grand jury challenges are difficult, expen­
sive, or too time consuming to warrant their attention. 6 Others feel 
that such attempts are hopeless in light of the United States Su­
preme Court's 1976 decision in Washington v. Davis,7 which inter­
posed an intent requirement onto equal protection claims. Cyni­
cism has led some defense lawyers to believe that challenges really 
do nothing to change the inherently suspect nature of the selection 
process. 8 Still other attorneys base their failure to act upon an er­
roneous impression that their clients lack standing to raise such 
challenges9 or that the statistical disparities present in their cases 
4. For instance, in Washington, D.C., where the Public Defenders Office is 
known for its rigorous advocacy, the procurement of racial balance on the jury, grand 
or petit, has never been a major problem. This is primarily due to the large minOrity 
population and the selection system utilized. See OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DE­
FENDER, REP. ON CRIMINAL DEFENSE SERVo IN D.C. (Austern-Rezneck Rep., Apr. 
1975). In contrast, in places like Connecticut, where minority representation on 
grand juries is sadly scarce, such claims have been litigated in only three reported 
decisions. See State v. Villafane, 164 Conn. 637, 325 A.2d 251 (1973); State v. Cobbs, 
164 Conn. 402, 324 A.2d 234 (1973); State v. Kemp, 126 Conn. 60, 9 A.2d 63 (1939). 
5.. This is particularly true since, according to a nationwide survey of the selec­
tion methods used to choose grand jurors, at least 22 states employ some form of dis­
cretionary method. See J . VAN DYKE, JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES App. B, at 
264-70 (1977). 
6. The images conjured up by the well-known cases of Jo-Ann Little, Angela 
Davis, the Harrisburg Eight, John Mitchell, and Maurice Stans do little to refute this 
conclusion. Moreover, the statistical evidence necessarily involved in such a chal­
lenge often discourages attorneys with an aversion to mathematics. 
7. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
8. Admittedly, it is disconcerting to note that despite the United States Su­
preme Court's reversal of a Texas defendant's conviction because of the presence of 
discrimination in the grand jury selection process, jury selection officers in Texas 
continue to engage in discriminatory practices. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 (1977); Hernandez V. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 
(1950); Hill V. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith V. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940). 
9. Many defense attorneys are unaware that nonminority defendants in certain 
cases have standing to raise grand jury discrimination claims: standing is not de­
pendent on membership in a suspect class. In the federal system, the courts do not 
have to decide if the defendant "was in any way prejudiced by the wrongful exclu­
sion or whether he was one of the excluded class" when he challenges the selection 
process. Thiel V. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). See United States v. 
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are too small to be significant. Since no court has yet decided that 
failure to challenge the grand jury panel constitutes ineffective 
assistance of counsel, attorneys have not been warned by the ju­
diciary that such a challenge is necessary to conduct an adequate 
defense. 
It is to those who cry futility, plead poverty, or avow inexperi­
ence that this article is addressed. The myth that challenges to the 
grand jury array are to be pursued by rich defendants represented 
by experienced and well-seasoned defense attorneys must be eradi­
cated. 10 The belief that Davis and its progeny undermine discrimi­
nation claims and impose a legal barrier to their successful pursuit 
is a falsehood. Although compiling a statistical analysis sufficient to 
constitute a prima facie case of discrimination appears to be a com­
plex and confusing procedure, it is not such an overwhelmingly dif­
ficult task that an attorney should be excused from his obligation to 
present such a claim. Moreover, as will be discussed, use of a par­
ticular statistical model can result in successful challenges even 
when the statistical disparities are small. ll 
Zirpolo, 450 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1971); United States v. Kuhn, 441 F.2d 179 (5th Cir. 
1971); United States v. Leonetti, 291 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N .Y. 1968). It does not matter 
whether the challenge is based upon a federal statute, the supervisory power of the 
federal courts, or the Constitution. See United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 567 n.2 
(1st Cir. 1970). 
Similarly, defendants in state courts can challenge grand jury composition re­
gardless of their membership in the excluded class. See, e.g., Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 
493 (1972). In Peters, a white defendant successfully challenged the state's system of 
excluding blacks from the grand jury. Although the challenge was based on equal 
protection as well as due process theories, the Court chose to ground its decision 
only upon the latter clause. The analytical scheme to be applied remains the same, 
however, when such a challenge is brought on the ground of equal protection. [d. 
See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975) (a male may bring suit for system­
atic exemption for females). 
Affirmative action suits also can be brought in federal court regardless of 
whether the named plaintiff is a member of the underrepresented group. See Turner 
v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 
320 (1970). 
10. As this article will attempt to show, challenges to the array are not as com­
plicated as the literature on the subject indicates. Although much of such" literature is 
thorough and well written, the authors tend to overemphasize the scope of the project 
and the burden such challenges will entail. See, e.g., A. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN 
CRIMINAL TRIALS (1975). Contrary to Ginger's outlook, it is not essential to mount a 
defense committee or team to perform multitudinous tasks. Id. at 102. See also 
Finkelstein, The Application of Statistical Decision Theory to the Jury Discrimina­
tion Cases, 80 HARV. L. REV. 338 (1966). 
Perhaps the most difficult task is to gain an understanding of the statistical data. 
Once that has been mastered, it is relatively easy to raise a grand jury challenge. See 
text accompanying notes 65-66 infra. 
II. This article will attempt to refute the theory that grand jury challenges are 
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In many states, criminal defendants are indicted day after day 

by grand juries chosen through a selection method that substan­

tially underrepresents racial, ethnic, and other cognizable groups 

present in the population. 12 Thus, an onslaught of discrimination 

challenges at the pretrial stage13 is crucial to ensure that criminal 

defendants will receive maximum protection of their constitutional 

rights and the best possible defense to the charges brought against 

them. 14 
The absence of "ineffective assistance of counsel" claims 

brought by defendants for failure to file discrimination challenges 

should not signify that lawyers are free to abandon such challenges 

with impunity. Clearly, under any definition of effective assistance, 

such challenges must be made. 15 Only a barrage of claims ,will 

fruitless when a small minority population is the target of discrim'ination. See ~irys, 

Kadane & Lehoczyk,Jury Representativeness: A Mandate for M~ltiple Sotirc'e Lists,' 

65 CALIF. L. REV. 776; 778 (1977). ' , " " 

12. For ,a general discussion of 'the prevalence of this 'significant' undei- , 

representation, see ]. VAN DYKE, supra note 5, at 28-35~ , ' " , ' ,', 

, 13. Although the Court in'Rose v. Mitchell, 443 l/.S. 545'(1979),' recently deter~ 
, IIlined that its decision in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), did not eliminate the ' 'I, 
federal court as a proper foru~ i~~ state' ~riminaI d~fendants to raise j~ry',discrimina~ 

tion Claims, the CO!-lrt nonetheles~ did not retreat from its position' t~atgrandjufY,' 

'challenges must be made according to the state's criminal procedure law. See 

Francis v. Henderson, 425 'U.S. 536 (1976) (in the absence ofcaus'e for failure to 

, 	challenge and in the absence' of actual prejudice, a state prisoner who failed to make 
a timely 'challenge to grand jury composition could not raise the issue in a post­
conviction federal habeas corpus action); Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973) 
(in the absence of a showing of incompetent advice of counsel, a guilty plea entered 
upon advice of counsel in a state prosecution precluded habeas corpus relief for ra­
cial discrimination in selection of the grand jury). 
14. Although this article deals primarily with challenges to the "key-man" se­

lection system, where by the source of the names and the method of selection is 

controlled by a single individual, challenges to other types of selection devices are 

possible. Consider, for example, the challenges to the judicial selection system in 

California, the jury commission system in Louisiana, and the judge selection and in­

terview system in Pennsylvania, described by A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 108-15. 

In NATIONAL JURY PROJECT, JURYWORK: SYSTEMATIC TECHNIQUES: A MANUAL FOR 

LAWYERS, LEGAL WORKERS AND SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (B. Bonora & E. Krauss ed. 

1979) the editors distinguished four types of challenges: Those based on source of 

names, method of selection, composition of the pool, and violation of statutory proce­

dures or standards. Also, grand jurors chosen pursuant to the Federal Jury Selection 

and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1976), may be subject to constitutional attack. See 

Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 814 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 

564, 568 n.7 (1st Cir. 1970); United States v. DiTomasso, 405 F.2d 385, 391 (4th Cir. 

1968); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34, 50 (5th Cir. 1966). 

15. One of the most exhaustive judicial treatments of ineffective assistance of 

counsel claims can be found in United States v. Decoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 

1979). See A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 92, in which the author suggests that the fail­

ure of attorneys to at least consider the legal and factual bases for a grand jury' chal­

lenge may constitute malpractice. 
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make the courts realize that grand jury challenges are as integral to 
an adequate defense as the numerous other pretrial motions 
routinely filed on behalf of criminal defendants. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
Over one hundred years have passed since the United States 
Supreme Court first held that a criminal conviction could not be . 
sustained if it was procured from juries, either grand or petit, from 
which an identifiable class has been systematically excluded. 16 Not 
once during these years has the Court retreated from this stalwart 
position. 17 
These principles compel the conclusion that a State cannot, con­
sistent with due process, subject a defendant to indictment or 
trial by a jury that has been selected in an arbitrary and discrim­
inatory manner, in violation of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States. Illegal and unconstitutional jury selection proce­
dures cast doubt on the integrity of the whole judicial process. 
They create the appearance of bias in the decision of individual 
cases, and they increase the risk of actual bi~ as well. 18 
In order to dispel the possibility of prejudicial taint, the Court 
has insisted that "the jury be a body truly representative of the 
community."19 This mandate does not mean, however, that each 
individual jury must mirror the exact population of the commu­
nity.2o As long as the selection procedures protect members of an 
identifiable class from being substaritially underrepresented in the 
grand jury array, the jury will not be invalidated. 21 To survive con­
stitutional attack, both grand and petit juries must meet the same 
stringent standard. 22 
16. Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 
303 (1879). 
17. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 
482 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Coleman v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 22 
(1967); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475 (1954); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 
(1940); Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904). 
18. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502-03 (1972). 
19. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 
U.S. 522, 527 (1975); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 
(1970); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946). 
20. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208 (1965); Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., , 
328 U.S. 217, 220 (1946). 
21. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). As the Court in 
Castaneda made clear, even. if a system is constitutional on its face, it may still be 
susceptible to abuse, rendering its use unconstitutional. Id. at 497. 
22. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628 (1972); Carter v. Jury Comm'n of 
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Although a defendant cannot demand that members of his race 
be included on the grand jury that indicts him, "he is entitled to 
require that the State not deliberately and systematically deny to 
members of his race the right to participate as jurors in the admin­
istration of justice. "23 Whether purposeful discrimination leads to 
total exclusion or merely substantial underrepresentation of minor­
ity groups on the jury, it rises to the level of a severe constitutional 
violation. 24 
III. 	 ANALYSIS OF CASTANEDA TEST AND ITS APPLICATION 
TO KEy-MAN GRAND JURY CHALLENGES 
The United States Supreme Court recently devised a tripartite 
test by which to determine whether equal protection violations 
have occurred in a grand jury selection process. 25 Under the test, 
enunciated in Castaneda v. Partida,26 it must be shown that a rec­
ognizable and distinct class has been "singled out for different 
treatment under the laws as written or as applied."27 "Second, the 
degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the 
proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion 
called to serve as grand jurors, over a significant period of time. "28 
Third, a grand jury selection process that is susceptible to abuse or 
that is not racially neutral "supports the presumption of discrimina-
Greene County, 396 U.S. 320, 330 (1970); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479 
(1954). 
Even if there is no constitutional requirement that states institute prosecutions 
by means of an indictment returned by a grand jury, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 
516 (1884), if a state chooses to employ grand juries, it must comply with the dictates 
of the fourteenth amendment when choosing those juries. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 
545,557 n.7 (1979). ­
23. Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 628-29 (1972). See also Cobbs v. 
Robinson, 528 F.2d, 1331, 1334 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976). 
I .
24. Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 
346,362-63 (1970). See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The earlier cases 
involved absolute exclusion, while more recently the challenges have been based on 
mere underrepresentation. 
25. Although United States v. Rodriguez, 588 F.2d 1003, 1007 (5th Cir. 1979), 
indicated that this was only a two-part test, the United States Supreme Court has 
failed to-sustain any challenge in the absence of this third showing. See notes 88-90 
infra and accompanying text. 
26. 430 U.S. 482 (1977). The Supreme Court did not establish a new principle 
of constitutional law in Castaneda. The Court merely distilled a succinct formula 
which had already been expressed in various forms in its previous decisions. Id. at 
494-95. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360 (1970); Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 
U.S. 584, 587 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 478 (1954). 
27. 430 U.S. at 494-95. 
28. Id. 
" 
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tion raised by the statistical showing. "29 Once a defendant has 
shown, by a preponderance of the evidence, a substantial under­
representation of his group that is not due to any random method 
of selection, he has made out a prima facie case of discriminatory 
purpose. The burden then shifts to the state to rebut the defend­
ant's case. 30 
A. Proof of Cognizable Class: First Prong of the Castaneda Test 
Although the early cases involving grand jury challenges raised 
only racial discrimination claims,31 the litigation Beld gradually has 
expanded to include other groups subject to discriminatory treat­
ment. Hernandez v. Texas32 settled whether discrimination on the 
basis of ethnic identity in grand jury selection was as constitution­
ally suspect as racial discrimination and as deserving of fourteenth 
amendment protection. 33 The exclusion of women from grand jury 
panels was found to violate constitutional mandates as early as 
194634 and as recently as 1979. 35 Challenges also have been 
mounted for exclusion based on age,36 religious belief,37 economic 
status,38 or other background. 39 
That the group involved may be small is of scant signm­
29. [d. 
30. See Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565 (1979); 430 U.S. at 495. 
31. Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 592 (1896); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 
(1880); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
32. 347 U.S. 475 (1954). See also Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975); 
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880). 
33. 347 U.S. at 477-78. 
34. Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). 
35. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357 (1979). 
36. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. 
Olson, 473 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); United States v. 
Guzman, 468 F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cen. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). Generally, 
such challenges have met with failure. But see United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564 
(1st Cir. 1970). 
37. United States v. Suskin, 450 F.2d 596 (2d Cir. 1971); People v. White, 43 
Cal. 2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 (1954), cen. denied, White v. California, 350 U.S. 875 (1955); 
Commonwealth v. Bastarache, 1980 Mass. App. Adv. Sh. 1729,409 N.E.2d 796. 
38. See United States v. Tijerina, 446 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971); Labat v. 
Bennett, 365 F.2d 698 (5th Cir. 1966). 
39. The Court, in Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (1946), concluded 
that any economic, social, religious, racial, political, and geographic groups of the 
community could constitute a cognizable group. [d. at 225. See Carter v. Jury 
Comm'n of Greene County, 396 U.S. 320 (1970); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 
60 (1942); Rabinowitz v. United States, 366 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1966). For the speCific 
problems inherent in each of these challenges, see Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805, 
823 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Butera, 420 F.2d 564, 569 (1st Cir. 1970); A. 
GINGER, supra note 10, at 168. 
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cance.40 In order to establish cognizability under Castaneda, it is 
necessary to show that a class of persons has been "singled out for 
different treatment under ·the laws, as written or as applied. "41 Al­
though there must be more than a mere showing that the group 
has similar characteristics, the burden to demonstrate the existence 
of a cognizable class is reasonably easy to meet. Any evidence that 
the community group is distinctive42 in a way that would cause it 
to be subjected to differential treatment may well fulfill this first 
prong of the Castaneda test. "Whether such a group exists within a 
community is a question of fact"43 that can be approached from 
several different perspectives. 44 The presence of internal cohesion 
constitutes strong evidence of an identifiable group whose interests 
cannot be protected adequately by other members of the grand 
jury pane1.45 Alternatively, the attitude of the community can con­
stitute sufficient proof of a cognizable class. 46 
40. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950). In Foster v. Sparks, 506 
F.2d 805, App. at 820 (5th Cir. 1975), Judge Gerwin, an independent author of the 
appendix, suggests that courts obviate the need for proof of size by taking judicial 
notice of cognizability. 
41. 430 U.S. at 494. The scope of such challenges is in fact infinite. As the 
Court acknowledged in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), "[c1ommunities dif­
fer at different times and places. What is a fair cross section at one time or place is 
not necessarily a fair cross section at another time or a different place." Id. at 537. 
42. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 479. 
43. [d. at 478. 
44. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976), in which the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit developed its own test to determine the presence of 
an identifiable class in a jury discrimination case: 
[t1o establish cognizability, it is necessary to prove the following: (1) The 
presence of some quality or attribute which 'defines and limits' the group; 
(2) a cohesiveness of 'attitudes or ideas or experience' which distinguishes 
the group from the general social milieu; and (3) a 'community of interest' 
which may not be represented by other segments of society. 
[d. at 591. See also United States v. Guzman, 337 F. Supp. 140 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 468 
F.2d 1245 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973), for the application of a 
similar test. 
45. United States v. Potter, 552 F.2d 901, 904 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. 
Guzman, 468 F.2d.1245, 1247 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 937 (1973). 
46. 347 U.S. at 479; Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. 
denied, 424 U.S. 947 (1976). As the court explained in United States v. Potter, 552 
F.2d 901 (9th Cir. 1977): 
[w1e must consider whether a particular class is in fact thought of as an iden­
tifiable group by the larger community.... In assessing this factor, the fact 
of prejudice or community discrimination against the group would clearly be 
significant, ... because of its tendency to defeat the concept of an impartial 
grand jury. 
Id. at 905 (citations omitted). Thus, in Hernandez the Supreme Court based its af­
firmative finding of cognizability on the following four factors: (a) The residents of 
the community distinguished between whites and Mexican-Americans; (b) participa­
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The actual evidence that must be presented to show that a 
particular group has been singled out for differential treatment can 
be derived from a number of sources. Attorneys commonly prove 
cognizability by citing jury cases where the group in question al­
ready has been recognized as a cognizable class and by urging the 
judge to take notice of that statuS. 47 
Government documents often can serve as indicators of sys­
tematic discrimination. 48 The state's commission on human rights 
or the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission may collect 
data and complaints that demonstrate a pattern of discriminatory 
practices aimed at a particular groUp.49 The governor of a state 
may have appointed a commission to address the problems of a 
particular minority community. 50 Attorneys also can examine 
whether the electronic media specifically addresses itself to the 
group in question or whether special programs are conducted by 
antipoverty, charitable, or civic organizations to serve the needs of 
the purportedly excluded group. 51 Often, government agencies 
~uch as the Department of Health and Human Resources under­
take special language programs that are directed toward a particu­
lar group. 
tion of Mexican-Americans in business and community groups was marginal; (c) 
Mexican-Americans attended segregated schools; and (d) Mexican-Americans were 
confined to separate restaurant and toilet facilities. Id. at 479-80. 
47. See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 495. One can also pOint to voter regis­
tration cases, such as Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in which clearly 
defined groups have been judicially recognized. 
48. See e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE publications; U.S. COMM'N on CIV. 
RTS., PUERTO RICANS IN THE UNITED STATES: AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE (Oct. 1976); 
COUNTING THE FORGOTTEN (Apr. 1974); U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS OF POPU­
LATION (1970 & 1980). Documents issued by state health departments, city planning 
agencies, and education departments also are helpful to demonstrate the existence of 
a cognizable class. 
49. Use of the state or federal freedom of information aCts can also be valuable 
tools to prod government officials who may be reluctant to release any of these gov­
ernment documents. 
50. In Connecticut, for instance, the governor appointed a Council on Spanish­
Speaking Opportunities. The proclamation establishing such a task force provides 
valuable language which can be used to make a showing of cognizability. See CT. 
DEP'T OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, REP. OF THE GOVERNOR'S COUNCIL ON SPANISH­
SPEAKING OPPORTUNITIES (Mar. 1973). 
51. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp 78 (D. Conn. 1980), aII'd, 639 F.2d 
770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981), in which the 
district court, in order to find that Puerto Ricans comprised a cognizable class, took 
notice of Spanish radio station broadcasts and various programs aimed at Hispanics 
which were run by an antipoverty agency, the Boy Scouts, and a charitable organiza­
tion. Id. at 80 n.3. 
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B. Proof of Substantial Underrepresentation: Second Prong of the 
Castaneda Test 
The second step in showing a violation of the equal protection 
clause is demonstrating that members of the identifiable group 
have been underrepresented substantially in grand juries over a 
significant period of time. 52 Such underrepresentation is shown by 
the "rule of exclusion."53 As the United States Supreme Court 
stated in Castaneda, the degree of underrepresentation in a given 
case is shown by comparing the proportion that the identifiable 
group bears to the population of the area from which grand jurors 
are chosen with the proportion that group bears to the total num­
ber of those called to serve as grand jurors over a significant period 
of time. 54 If such a statistical comparison reveals a substantial dis­
crepancy between the group's proportion in the total population 
and its proportion among grand jurors, that discrepancy gives rise 
to a presumption that members of the group have been excluded 
purposefully from membership on grand juries. 55 The requirement 
that the showing be substantial must therefore be read as "substan­
tial enough to justify an inference of impermissible discriminatory 
motives. "56 The underlying need for this showing is derived from 
the requirement of intent that recently has been superimposed 
52. 430 U.S. at 494. 
53. 430 U.S. at 492; Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Eubanks v. 
Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584 (1958); Hernandez v. Texas. 347 U.S. at 475. 
54. 430 U.S. at 494; 347 U.S. at 480. In Castaneda, the Court facilitated the 
showing for a prima facie case by requiring a comparison of figures representing the 
number of minority members actually chosen to figures representing their proportion 
in the total population. 430 U.S. at 494-96. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 
(1972), in which the Court looked at the proportion of "eligible" blacks. Id. at '630. 
Thus, concern with the eligible population comes into play only later in an attempt 
to rebut the government's case. See text accompanying notes 105-14 infra. The 
Court's rationale in Castaneda for this change in focus is not explained in the major­
ity opinion. Chief Justice Burger, with whom Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined, 
dissented, expressing bewilderment with the majority's conclusion. 430 U.S. at 504. 
It is the author's view that the majority was correct in first examining gross popula­
tion figures rather than eligible population figures. See United States ex rei. 
Barksdale v. Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253, 262-64 (5th Cir.), rehearing granted, 616 F.2d 
254 (5th Cir. 1980). 
55. This presumption of purposeful exclusion is based on the reasoning that 
"[ilf a disparity is sufficiently large, then it is unlikely that it is due solely to chance 
or accident, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, one must conclude that 
racial or other class-related factors entered into the selection process." 430 U.S. at 
494 n.13 (citations omitted). 
56. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 82 (D. Conn. 1980), afI'd, 639 
F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W..3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). 
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onto equal protection challenges brought pursuant to the four­
teenth amendment. 57 
Until the United States Supreme Court decided Davis in 
1976, persons who raised discrimination claims based upon the 
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment could win 
their lawsuits merely by making a statistical showing that their par­
ticular suspect class was underrepresented. 58 When the Court de­
cided Davis, however, it complicated the showing by asserting that 
"the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory 
must ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. "59 
Despite such an exhortation, as Justice Stevens acknowledged 
in his concurring opinion in Davis, "[this] line between discrimina­
tory purpose and diSCriminatory impact is not nearly as bright, and 
perhaps not quite as critical, as the reader of the Court's opinion 
might assume. "60 In fact, the Court's majority admits that, of ne­
cessity, "an invidious diSCriminatory purpose may often be inferred 
from the totality of the relevant facts, including the fact, if it is 
true, that the law bears more heavily on one race than another. "61 
One year later, in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp., 62 the Court again emphasized that a 
discriminatory purpose could be proven by either circumstantial or 
direct evidence. The Court ·reasoned that "[s]ometimes a clear pat­
tern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, emerges from the 
effect of the state action even when the governing legislation ap­
pears neutral on its face,"63 
Although the Court in Castaneda uneqUivocally extended the 
Davis doctrine to claims alleging grand jury discrimination,64 it did 
not impose a significantly greater burden upon criminal defendants 
attempting to prove discriminatory intent. On the contrary, the 
57. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979); Duren v. 
Missouri, 439 U.s. 357, 368 n.26 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 239. 
58. See Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 461 (1972); Palmer v. 
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 219 (1971); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Bridgeport Civil 
Servo Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1336 (2d Cir. 1973); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 
732 (1st Cir. 1972); Chance V. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 
1972). 
59. 426 U.S. at 240. 
60. ld. at 254 (Stevens, 1-, concurring). 
61. ld. at 242. 
62. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
63. ld. at 266. 
64. 430 U.S. at 493. "An official act is not unconstitutional solely because it has 
a racially disproportionate impact." ld. (emphasis in original). 
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Court has consistently singled out jury selection cases for differen­
tial treabnent. Careful analysis reveals that the petitioners in jury 
selection cases have been held to a far less stringent burden of 
proof in showing diSCriminatory purpose than those who raise equal 
protection claims in nonjury cases. 65 
Because statistics alone may amount to circumstantial evidence 
sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the Castaneda test,66 a 
thorough understanding of the statistical approaches that can be 
used to assess the significance of the disparities is crucial. It is usu­
ally this portion of a grand jury challenge that is most disconcerting 
to attorneys who profess inability to conduct mathematical analysis. 
Because of an attorney's misconception that disparities in his case 
are statistically insignificant, valid challenges may go unlitigated. 
As will be discussed, however, the statistical evidence needed to 
mount a successful jury challenge is relatively uncomplicated and 
can be explained in terms that are comprehensible even to one not 
versed in mathematical parlance. 
There are four basic statistical models from which to choose, 
each having its own pitfalls. The most traditional of these models is 
the "absolute difference test," which requires subtracting the per-, 
centage of minority group members on the venire or pool from the 
percentage of the minority group members eligible for service. 67 
Although this method generally is adequate to assess the under­
representation of groups that comprise large parts of their respec­
tive relevant populations,68 it is an inadequate method to assess 
the underrepresentation of a group that is but a small part of the 
relevant population. 69 
65. In Davis, the Court held that "It is also not· infrequently true that the dis­
criminatory impact-in the jury cases for example, the total or seriously dispropor­
tionate exclusion of Negroes from jury venires-may for all practical purposes dem­
onstrate unconstitutionality because in various circumstances the discrimination is 
very difficult to explain on non-racial grounds." 426 U.S. at 242. See also Newman v. 
Henderson, 539 F.2d 502, 505, rehearing denied, 544 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1976), cen. 
denied, Maggio v. Newman, 433 U.S. 914 (1977). 
66. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14 
(1977). For instance, if Blacks comprised 30% of the. total population and 20% of the 
eligible population, there would be an absolute disparity for Blacks of 10%. 
67. See United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577, 589 n.12 (10th Cir. 1976). 
68. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 
475, Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935). 
69. By this measure, even total exclusion of a group comprising 2% of the eligi­
ble population would result in underrepresentation of only 2%. This percentage dif­
ferential is highly misleading. See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172 (8th Cir. 1978), in 
which the court pointed out that when the underrepresented class constituted a 
small percentage of the population, a small absolute percentage difference between 
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A second approach examines the ratio or comparison between 
the population of the group actually chosen for jury duty and the 
proportion of the eligible population. Even if the purportedly ex­
cluded group comprises a small percentage of the eligible popula­
tion and an even smaller percentage of grand jurors chosen, there 
can still be substantial underrepresentation but it might be over­
looked because of the supposed statistical insignificance. 70 
A third model focuses upon the actual number of grand jurors 
excluded from the venire.71 Although such an approach may be ac­
curate when dealing with a large group's representation in the pool 
population, the smaller the group's representation, the more mis­
leading it is to assess the significance of its underrepresentation by 
calculating how many individuals have been excluded. 72 An addi­
tional problem with this approach is that rather than testing for the 
intent of the prosecuting state, which is the real focus in a grand 
the class' proportion to the relevant population and its representation on grand juries 
may be far 	more significant than a much higher absolute percentage difference in a 
case in which the underrepresented class constituted a larger part of the population. 
Id. at 175. See also Davis v. Dallas, 487 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N .D. Tex. 1980). Indeed, 
the Fifth Circuit has emphasized that the only occasion on which consideration of 
other statistical methods may be inappropriate is when the minority excluded ex­
ceeds 10% of the population. See United States v. Butler, 615 F.2d 1066 rehearing en 
bane denied 615 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1980). 
70. If one applies the figures in the case of Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 
78 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), eert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 
3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981), when the excluded group comprises .93% of the eligible 
population, and .27% of the grand jurors chosen, there is 71% underrepresentation. 
This is calculated as follows: 
100 x 	(1 - Proportion of group actually chosen) 

Proportion of eligible population 

71. See United States v. Kleifgen, 557 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 1977). See also 
United States v. Test, 550 F.2d 577 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Goff, 509 F.2d 
825 (5th Cir.), eerl. denied, 423 U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 
1248 (8th Cir.), eeTt. denied, 416 U.S. 990 (1974). Significantly, all these cases pre­
ceded Castaneda. 
72. This is best illustrated by the following example. Assuming that 1,000 
grand jurors are chosen over a 10-year period, a group comprising 2% of the eligible 
population but only 1% of grand jurors will have lost 10 individual places, or one per 
year. A much larger group, comprising 40% of the eligible population, and 
underrepresented on grand juries by the same one absolute percentage difference, 
will have been selected 390 times instead of 400 tim~s. The number of individuals 
excluded is again 10, or one per year. Although the number of individuals excluded 
is the same in each case, the underrepresentation of the first group is probably not 
due to chance. The underrepresentation of the second group, conversely, may well 
be due to chance. This, of course, is the heart of the question. Purposeful exclusion 
is presumed when a group's underrepresentation is not attributable to chance and is 
not otherwise satisfactorily accounted for by the state. 
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jury challenge, it is better designed to test for harm to the com­
plaining defendant. 73 
The statistical decision theory (SDT) is the most sophisticated 
and precise of the four models and often can be used as a basis for 
a successful challenge even when application of the other three 
methods fails to produce significant disparities. Adopted for the 
first time by the Supreme Court in Castaneda to measure the sig­
nificance of the statistical disparities,74 it is the least understood of 
the models and yet certainly the most effective. This method takes 
into account not only the disparity between the group's representa­
tion in the population and its representation among grand jurors 
but, more importantly, the improbability that such a disparity 
would have resulted from a racially and ethnically neutral random 
selection process. 75 With such a test, one can "learn the probabil­
73. See Villafane v. Manson, 504 F.2d F. Supp. 78, 83 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd 
639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). 
74. Although the statistical decision theory [hereinafter referred to as SDTj was 
first expounded upon by Finkelstein in his article, see note 10 supra, and was ac­
knowledged as useful by the Court in Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 603 n.9 
(1972) and Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 552 n.2 (196'1), it was not fully embraced 
by the Court until its decision in Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 496 n.17. Since 
that time it has been lauded as a "precise method of reasoning the significance of 
statistical disparities" by the Court in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 
U.S. 299, 308-09 n.14 (1977) and by other federal courts. See Board of Educ. of City 
School Dist. of N.Y. v. Califano, 584 F.2d 576, 584 n.29 (2d Cir. 1978), affd sub. 
nom., Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of N.Y. v. Harris, 444 U.S. 130 (1979); 
Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 81-82 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d 
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981); Guardians Ass'n of 
N.Y. City Police Dep't v. Civil Servo Comm'n of N.Y., 484 F. Supp. 785, 793 
(S.D.N.Y. 1980); Caufield v. Board of Educ. of N.Y., 486 F. Supp. 862,902 (E.D.N.Y. 
1979); Cooper V. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex. 
1979). 
75. The method requires three steps. The first is to calculate the percentage 
which the putatively excluded group would occupy on grand juries as the result of a 
series of random selections of grand jurors. The second step is to compare this hypo­
thetical result with the result of the selection decisions that were actually made. The 
third step is to assess the significance of the difference between the expecte<;l and 
the actual results. This is done by calculating the probability that the deviation from 
the expected result is due to chance. Since the improbability that the actual result of 
grand juror selection was due to chance is what gives rise to the presumption of pur­
poseful exclusion, the final calculation needed to justify the presumption of purpose­
ful exclusion, and thereby to make out a prima facie case of exclusion, must show the 
following: for a sample of the given size, the deviation from the result that normally 
would be expected from random selection is so great as to be incompatible with the 
hypothesis that the selection was random. A probability of less than .05%, that is, a 
chance of less than 1 in 20, is generally considered by statisticians to be small 
enough to warrant rejection of the hypothesis of random selection, and, therefore, 
can establish the presumption of purposeful discriminatory exclusion. See Villafane 
v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 81-87 (D. Conn. 1980), affd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir: 
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ity that the observed value could have happened by chance, i. e., 
the probability that in a random sample of an appropriate test pop­
ulation, the variable would exhibit a value as extreme as that ob­
served. "76 
The superiority of the fourth model over the three forms of 
analysis traditionally applied in grand jury discrimination cases is 
evident when analyzing the distinct advantages that it possesses 
over the others.77 First, SDT allows a court to assess the signifi­
cance of a given disparity between the proportion of a group's 
membership in a grand jury and its proportion in the total popula­
tion with the aid of a statistical probability theory. It predicts for 
the court the likelihood that an event that appears extreme or un­
likely would result from chance. While the other three methods 
leave the court with no means to draw conclusions from the nu­
merical calculations, SDT quantifies the likelihood that the discrep­
ancy will occur, thus offering a reliable criterion through which to 
interpret the significance of the differentials. 78 
Second, SDT surpasses the other methods by being the only 
one to take into account the size of the sample. Because the size of 
the sample figures directly into the statistical calculations and be­
cause the larger the sample the more confidence one has in the 
data, it is clear that this method will result in more valid conclu­
sions. 79 
Perhaps most important, SDT is especially effective when the 
putatively excluded group comprises only a small proportion of the 
1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981); Davis v. Dallas, 483 F. 
Supp. 54, 57 n.3 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Cooper v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. 
Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex. 1979); Finkelstein, supra note 10, at 359. 
76. Cooper v. University of Tex. at Dallas, 482 F. Supp. 187, 194 (N.D. Tex. 
1979). 
77. For a thorough discussion of the "absolute difference test," the "ratio ap­
proach," the "actual numbers approach," and their pitfalls, see Villafane v. Manson, 
504 F. Supp. 78, afI'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 
(U.S. June 9, 1981). See also D. BALDUS & J. COLE, STATISTICAL PROOF OF DISCmMI­
NATION (1980); Kairys, Jury Selection: The Law, A Mathematical Method of Analy­
sis and a Case Study, 10 CmM. L. REV. 771 (1972); Sperlich & Jasporic, Statistical 
Decision Theory and the Selection of Grand Jurors: .Testing for Discrimination in a 
Single Panel, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 75 (1975). 
78. See, e.g., Davis v. Dallas, 487 F. Supp. 389, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1980). 
79. See also Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). The Sixth Circuit noted the advantages of such a 
method: "[i]n most reported cases thus far, this statistical analysis has been largely in­
tuitive, based on rough impressions about probabilities. However, given accurate 
data, the probability that racial results are due to chance can be analyzed mathemat­
ically and either affirmed or rebutted with considerable accuracy." Id. at 133 nA. 
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total population. When the underrepresented class constitutes a 
small segment of the population, a small percentage differential be­
tween its proportion in the total population and its proportion 
among grand jury selections may be more meaningful than a far 
larger percentage differential in a case where the underrepresented 
class constitutes a larger percentage of the population. Again, SDT 
furnishes a statistical tool to assist the court in making this determi­
nation. 8o 
The greatest pitfalls of SDT may be time and expense. A stat­
istician must be employed to compute the information that will be 
introduced into evidence. 81 H the issue is raised before trial in a 
motion to quash, then the testimony or affidavit of this expert is 
crucial to making a proper record. 82 
Although the data analysis is relatively easy for a mathemati­
cian, it is the data collection itself that often makes an attorney feel 
helpless. The United States census is the best source of the total 
population figures that are needed for part two of the Castaneda 
test. 83 It is also necessary to ascertain the number of the putative 
group actually chosen in order to calculate the group's representa­
tion in the pool. Several methods can be utilized. If the cognizable 
group in question consists of women or young people, often that 
data is readily available on the jury questionnaire. 84 If the cogniza-' 
ble group consists of Hispanics, a community leader of the His­
panic community can be hired to go over the jurors' names and to 
80. See Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 174 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978); Villafane v. 
Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 85 (D. Conn. 1980), aff'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), 
cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). 
81. Although resort to prior discrimination cases may be sufficient to prove 
cognizability, it certainly is insufficient to show statistical disparity. See Rose v. 
Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 572 n.12 (1979). 
82. Rose v. Mitchell, id. at 545, provides an example of a record devoid of the 
proper statistical proof. Because there was no evidence as to the total number of 
foremen appointed by the judges in Tipton County during the critical period in 
question, the Court found it impossible to determine if the statistical disparity was 
significant enough to make out a case of discrimination under the rules of exclusion. 
Id. at 571. 
83. It should always be argued, however, that when dealing with minority 
groups, the census may fail to give an accurate count, erring on the side of 
undercounting. See U.S. COMM'N ON Crv. RTS., COUNTING THE FORGOTTEN, supra 
note 48, at 2. 
84. A motion for discovery may be needed to secure access to the jury selection 
records. Although in Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28 (1975), the unqualified right 
to discovery and inspection of federal jury materials was based upon a statutory pro­
vision, 28 U.S.C. § 1867(f) (1976), the reasoning is equally persuasive for obtaining 
such discovery in state court challenges. 
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identify members of that ethnic group.85 If blacks constitute the 
cognizable class, the process of identification is somewhat more dif­
ficult, especially in states where race is not recorded. In those 
cases, an extensive telephone survey may be the only way to iden­
tify a person's race. 86 
Apart from requiring a witness to demonstrate the size of the 
excluded group and selectivity inconsistent with randomness, no 
other testimonial evidence is absolutely necessary.87 Since the cost 
of hiring a witness should be commensurate with the amount of 
time spent to complete the requested project, the expenses may 
not be as inflated as anticipated. 88 
C. System Susceptible to Abuse: Castaneda's Third Prong? 
According to Castaneda, a demonstration that the grand jury 
selection procedure is "susceptible to abuse or'is not racially neu­
tral"89 is necessary only to support the presumption of discrimina­
tion raised by the statistical showing. Yet the Court has never 
found discrimination amounting to a constitutional violation absent 
proof of such subjectivity in the selection process. 90 What consti­
85, On occasion, a person's ethnic identity is difficult to ascertain from the 
spelling of his name. In those instances, a telephone survey can readily provide the 
answer. 
86. This task need not be too time-consuming or overwhelming. College or law 
students often can be convinced to take on this project. Also, once an attorney gath­
ers this data, which is usually not contested by the prosecution, another attorney can 
readily utilize these same figures and merely build onto the base already begun. 
Currently, information apparently is not traded. Cooperation would greatly facilitate 
these challenges. 
87. Although the elaborate list of experts mentioned by A. GINGER, supra note 
10, at 185, would certainly be impressive to a court, any testimony elicited from 
someone other than a statistician is mere surplusage. 
88. In order to keep costs to a minimum, perhaps the most fruitful ground for 
soliciting an affordable expert is a university or college in the area. Not only will a 
university professor have the credentials to impress a court, but he may be con­
vinced that such a project could be a worthwhile venture for the class which he 
teaches, or be impressive on a resume. Thus, the professor may be persuaded to do­
nate some of his time or at least work for a minimal rate. In most cases, since the de­
fendants will be indigent, defense counsel may have to resort to motions for pay­
ments of expert fees and rely on the in forma pauperis statutes. 
89. 430 U.S. at 494. 
90. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 353-55 (1970); Sims v. Georgia, 389 
U.S. 404,.407-08 (1967); Jones v. Georgia, 389 U.S. 24, 25 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 
345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1934). See also Alexander 
v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625 (1972), in which the Court relied not only upon the statis­
tical improbability but also upon the racially biased selection procedures in order to 
find a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 630. The converse has not been true, 
however. The presence of minimal statistical disparity, or the total absence of dispar­
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tutes a "substantial disparity" for statistical purposes has tended to 
depend, in part, upon the mechanism causing the disparity. If it 
proceeds from objective criteria, the disparity may be tolerable. If, 
however, it results from the application of a subjective procedure 
giving the selector wide opportunity to discriminate, the disparity 
that will be tolerated diminishes. 91 Thus, in Castaneda the Court 
examined the "highly subjective" selection system to buttress the 
statistical proof of discrimination offered by the defendant. 92 
Subjectivity can take various forms. Officials who select the 
grand jury clearly have an affirmative duty to learn who is qualified 
and to select individuals from all segments of society.93 When 
these officials fail to take steps to acquaint themselves with eligible 
members of a purportedly excluded population94 or fail to familiar­
ize themselves with racially neutral selection procedures,95 they 
have failed to meet their burden regardless of whether they con­
sciously intended to discriminate. 96 
Turner v. Fouche97 demonstrates how the absence of a ran­
ity, has not prevented the Court from finding purposeful discrimination. In Cassell v. 
Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950), when despite the absence of any significant statistical 
disparity, a prima facie case was proven by a demonstration that the jury commis­
sioners selected jurors on the basis of their personal acquaintances, did not include 
blacks, and made no effort to familiarize themselves with eligible voters. Id. at 
287-88. See also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 238 (1965) (Goldberg, J., dis­
senting); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978), Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 
1, 22 n.40 (5th Cir. 1966). As the Court noted in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 
239, an inference of purposeful discrimination can arise from any probative evidenti­
ary sources, including but not limited to statistics. See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 
U.S. 545, 592 (1979) (White, J., dissenting). 
91. See Blackwell v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 443, 447 n.7 (4th Cir. 1973). 
92. 430 U.S. at 497. 
93. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 370 (1970); Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 
129,135 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 443 U.S. 545 (1979). 
94. See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 289 (1950); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 
400, 404 (1942). 
95. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972); Whitus v. 
Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 551-52 (1967); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953). 
96. Courts repeatedly have emphasized that "officials who select grand jurors 
must be considered to have intended the natural results which flow from their con­
duct." Mitchell v. Rose, 570 F.2d 129, 135 (6th Cir. 1978), rev'd, Rose v. Mitchell, 
443 U.S. 545 (1979); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559,562 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311 
U.S. 128, 132 (1940); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978). It is irrele­
vant, therefore, that the motivation arises from a misconception that the law demands 
token representation or that such effort was a manifestation of an intent not to dis­
criminate. Such a practice still constitutes prima facie evidence of intentional dis­
crimination. Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 
128, 132 (1940); Ross v. Wyrick, 581 F.2d 172, 175 (8th Cir. 1978). 
97. 396 U.S. 346 (1970). 
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dom selection method proved fatal to the constitutional validity of a 
grand jury selection system. The jury commissioners in Turner 
pared the list themselves and purposefully eliminated blacks they 
felt were unintelligent or of questionable character. The Court, in 
holding that the underrepresentation warranted corrective action, 
singled out the use of subjective judgment as one of the causes of 
the impermissible disparity. 98 
One of the most egregious discriminatory selection methods 
occurs when there is purposeful inclusion of a certain class on the 
grand jury. Thus, if the sheriff intentionally chooses a black grand 
juror for the case of a black defendant,99 or a Hispanic grand juror 
for the case of a Hispanic defendant,lOo the selection system is 
invalid. 101 
Offering proof of discriminatory action on the part of the se­
lectors is not as difficult as it first appears. In key-man or jury com­
mission selection systems, where one person or a committee se­
lects jurors, it will be necessary to call the high sheriff or jury 
commissioner to the witness stand on behalf of the defendant to 
testifY at the pretrial hearing. The kind of discrimination in Turner 
may not be easy to elicit due to a natural reluctance on the part of 
the sheriff to admit that he purposely eliminated blacks he felt 
were unintelligent or unscrupulous. 102 The kind of discriminatory 
action found in Cassell v. Texas,103 however, may prove less bur­
densome. The only testimony that need be offered under Cassell is 
an admission by the sheriff or key-man that his failure to choose 
particular members of the suspect class was not due to any con­
scious decision on his part but merely due to his failure to know 
any eligible persons in that group. Thus, he can admit to his lack 
of knowledge without even realizing the constitutional deficiency of 
his practice. The same kind of evidence can be elicited when the 
98. See also Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 80 (D. Conn. 1980), afrd, 
639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). His­
panics comprised a significant and identifiable class; yet the sheriff failed to make 
any effort whatsoever to acquaint himself with Hispanics or to add the names of His­
panics to his source list. Id. 
99. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 287 (1950). 
100. Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. Supp. 78, 88 (D. Conn. 1980), afi'd, 639 F.2d 
770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3912 (U .S. June 9, 1981). 
101. The Court in Cassell warned that inclusion is just as unconstitutional as 
exclusion. 339 U.S. at 287. 
102. It may indeed be the wiser course of action to refrain from interviewing 
the selector prior to the hearing so he will not be alerted to the possible illegality of 
his action. 
103. 339 U.S. 282 (1950). 
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sheriff or key-man uses·· a discriminatory selection method 
consisting of the intentional matching of black jurors with black de­
fendants. Often these selectors are eager to emphasize their efforts 
to make such inclusions under the erroneous assumption that such 
actions are meritorious. 104 
D. 	 State's Rebuttal 
Once a defendant has made out a prima facie case of substan­
tial underrepresentation not caused by a random selection process, 
the burden shifts to the state to rebut the defendant's claim. 105 
The defendant's response to the state's rebuttal becomes the last 
hurdle to overcome before a successful challenge can be sustained. 
At least three avenues are available to the state in buttressing 
its case. First, the state can argue that there was no purposeful ex­
clusion or "intent to discriminate" against the putative class by the 
person responsible for selection. lOG Simple protestation from a 
commissioner that racial consideration played no part in the selec­
tion process, however, already has been rejected by the United 
States Supreme Court as insufficient evidence to rebut a defen­
dant's prima facie· case. 107 "The result bespeaks discrimination, 
whether or not it was a conscious decision on the part of any indi­
vidual jury commissioner. "108 Nor can the fact that the official was 
unacquainted with members of the excluded class excuse his con­
duct. 109 
Second, the state can point to recent efforts by the key-man or 
jury commission to· correct the disproportionate representation of 
104. See Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 132 (1940); Villafane v. Manson, 504 F. 
Supp. 78 (D. Conn. 1980), afI'd, 639 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 
U.S.L.w. 3912 (U.S. June 9, 1981). 
105. 	 Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 494-95. 
106. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Moore v. New York, 
333 U.S. 565 (1948). 
107. 430 U.S. at 498 n.19; Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625, 632 (1972); 
Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 361; Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 481-82; Glasser 
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 86 (1942); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 598 (1935). 
See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 593 (1979) (White, J., dissenting), in which it 
was suggested that a self-serving statement that the appointing authority had "noth­
ing against" appointing blacks would be insufficient rebuttal. Id. 
108. 347 U.S. at 482. See also Foster v. Sparks, 506 F.2d 805 (5th Cir. 1975). 
"Ignorance of the inadequacy of selection procedures would be as reprehensible as 
knowledge of such inadequacy and unwillingness to rectify." Id. at 823 (footnotes 
omitted). 
109. See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 360; Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 
551-52 (1967); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 290 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Hill v. 
Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 404 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 131-32 (1940). 
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members of the cognizable class from the grand jury array.ll0 
Whether this explanation will persuade a court depends upon how 
successful the efforts have been. A halfhearted attempt by the 
sheriff to comply with his affirmative duty may not excuse any sub­
stantial disparity. 111 
The state's third argument is the most damaging to the de­
fendant's prima facie case. In many instances, the state can effec­
tively rebut a defendant's challenge merely by showing that the 
group is not underrepresented significantly in relation to the eligi­
ble, as opposed to the total, population. 112 This rationale has been 
used successfully to defeat grand jury challenges in a number of 
federal and state jurisdictions. 113 Unfortunately, little can be done 
to refute the numbers game if it is played accurately by the state. 
The defense could argue that the United States Supreme Court has 
yet to rule definitively on what disparity is Significant enough to 
sustain a grand jury challenge, or that the statistical disparity re­
sulting from use of eligible, as opposed to total, population figures, 
though small, is still so overwhelming as to subject the selection to 
constitutional attack. Efforts also should be taken to direct the 
, ~ourt's focus from the statistics to the subjective selection process. 
Even if the statistical disparity is small, the figures, coupled with 
the opportunity to discriminate by the sheriff, can result in a find­
ing of a constitutional violation. 114 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As is evident from the foregoing discussion, grand jury dis­
crimination challenges are not overwhelmingly difficult to mount. 
110. See Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945). 
111. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit was critical of this type of con­
duct by the jury selection officials: "[tlhey must uncover the source of competent 
jury prospects from all significantly identifiable elements of the community. Inno­
cent ignorance is no excuse. It neither shields the jury's action-verdict or 
indictment-from scrutiny, no does it justify the half-hearted, obviously incomplete 
performance of duty by the officials." Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 12 (5th Cir. 1966). 
112. See, e.g., United States v. Whitley, 491 F.2d 1248 (8th Cir. 1974); United 
States ex. rei. Chestnut Criminal Court, 442 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1977). 
113. To effectively rebut the defendant's prima facie case, the government's 
proof must consist of mor~ than a mere assertion that the putative group is less quali­
fied or less available than other groups. See, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. at 346; 
Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. at 475; Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 282. 
114. In fact, what constitutes a substantial disparity can depend in part upon 
the mechanism causing the disparity. If it proceeds from objective criteria, the dis­
parity may be tolerable, but "if the disparity proceeds from the application of subjec­
tive tests, under which there is wide opportunity for intentional racial discrimina­
tion, the tolerable disparity is diminished." Blackwell v. Thomas, 476 F.2d 443, 447 
n.7 (4th Cir. 1973). 
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The obvious obstacles of ignorance of the law, statistical inexperi­
ence, and financial constraints are all sunnountable through initia­
tive and creativity. 
Tremendous benefits can be derived from a discrimination 
challenge. At the pretrial stage a successful challenge will result in 
dismissal of the indictment. 115 Even if a second indictment is 
sought, evidence shows that the presence of even one minority 
grand juror on the subsequent grand jury panel can change the 
outcome. U6 At the post-trial stage, a grand jury challenge can fur­
nish the basis for an appeal through the state court system and can 
provide the basis for certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court. 117 In addition, federal habeas corpus relief remains a viable 
option after exhaustion of state court remedies. 118 
Indeed, aggressive advocacy demands that a grand jury chal­
lenge be incorporated into the defense of criminal actions. The 
challenge not only protects a criminal defendant from the unequal 
administration of justice, but it assures the defendant, if convicted, 
of an important issue to litigate on appeal. In addition to these 
benefits, the grand jury challenge furthers other important public 
interests. Perhaps the Supreme Court's recent warning best sum­
marizes the evils of allowing a discriminatory grand jury selection 
method to remain unchallenged: 
[s]election of members of a grand jury because they are of one 
race and not another destroys the appearance of justice and 
thereby casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial process. The 
exclusion from grand jury service of Negroes, or any group oth­
eIWise qualified to serve, impairs the confidence of the public in 
the administration of justice. As this Court repeatedly has em­
phasized, such discrimination "not only violates our Constitution 
and the laws enacted under it but is at war with our basic con­
cepts of a democratic society and a representative government." 
. . . "The injury is not limited to the defendant-there is injury 
to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the commu­
115. 	 Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556 (1979). 
116. See A. GINGER, supra note 10, at 94; 24 LAWYERS GUILD PRACTITIONER 
10 (1965). 
117. See Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. at 282; Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); 
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939). 
118. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. at 
482. For a discussion of the availability of federal habeas corpus relief as well as 
other federal remedies, see Diamond, Federal Remedies for Racial Discrimination in 
Grand Juror Selection, 16 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 85, 85-117 (1980). 
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nity at large, and to the democratic ideal reflected in the pro­
cesses of our courts. "119 
Thus, the obligation of criminal defense attorneys to litigate such 
challenges is compelling. Absent efforts by defense counsel, consti­
tutional violations will escape judicial review. 
119. Rose Y. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555-56 (1979), (quoting from, in part, 
Ballard Y. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) and Smith Y. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 
130 (1940)). 
